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White Collar Crime
• Edwin Sutherland defined white collar crime as "a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation" (1949).
• Crime in the streets v crime in the suites
• As of yet, no one in Ireland who has been prosecuted of 
white collar crime, has been imprisoned.
• Popular opinion that the law is too lenient on white collar 
criminals
Introduction
• Jeff Skilling of Enron- 26 years
• Bernie Ebbers of Worldcom - Convicted and 
sentenced to 25 years imprisonment
• Joseph Nacchio of Qwest - Convicted on 
nineteen counts of insider trading and sentenced 
to six years in prison and to pay $19 million in 
fines
• Bernie Madoff - convicted and sentenced to 150 
years imprisonment
• Creeping criminalization of conduct that was 
traditionally dealt with by other areas of the law
• Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Definition 
• “semi-professional” or have
• “special technical and professional 
knowledge.”
• Do all defendants have professional or 
semi-professional status? 
• Special skills
Definition
• 1981, the United States DOJ: “[n]onviolent crime 
for financial gain committed by means of 
deception by persons whose occupational status 
is entrepreneurial, professional or semi- 
professional and utilizing their special 
occupational skills and opportunities; also, 
nonviolent crime for financial gain utilizing 
deception and committed by anyone having 
special technical and professional knowledge of 
business and government, irrespective of the 
person’s occupation.”
Cost Implications
• Jail is costly: direct expenditures 
by federal, state, and local 
governments on corrections in 
2006: $68.7 billion
• Combined criminal justice 
expenditures: $214.3 billion
Cost (cont’d)
• Creeping criminalization has serious 
ramifications: 
• Undermines the coercive power of criminal law 
• Dilutes its expressive power
• Over-deters otherwise desirable activities
• Conflates blameworthiness with imprisonment
• Incentives for prosecutors to abuse powers
• Fuels an appetite for enhancing prison terms
• Increases social costs
Introduction (cont’d)
• Analysis limited to agency offences
• Intersection of risky behaviour and morally 
wrongful behaviour
• Moral blame must be disentangled from 
punishment
• Criminalization does not automatically 
entail imprisonment
• Objectives of punishment achieved under 
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and 
restorative models
Introduction (cont’d)
• sub-set of white-collar offenders – 
corporate fiduciaries abusing the principal- 
agent relationship
• inherently asymmetric
• Agents make up gaps in expertise, skill, 
and time that prevent principals from 
accomplishing the delegated tasks
• Company: collectivization of the principal 
creates incentives for free-riding and 
rational apathy
Claims
• Yield significant savings by reducing prison 
costs.
• Allows state to take advantage of the 
disproportionate cost/burden of conviction on 
agency offenders
• Deterrence can be achieved at lower cost by 
conviction alone
• If cost of incarceration is the same for offenders 
with different earning capacities, imprisoning 
those with very high earning capacities is a 
waste of social capital if objectives sought to be 
achieved by incarceration can be achieved via 
other means
Claims
• Cost of a conviction can be predicted 
with sufficient certainty in the case of 
white-collar criminals (earnings 
history)
• Contra common criminals, this loss 
ought to serve the deterrence function 
without the need for jail
Agency Offences
• Criminalization of the principal-agent 
problem
• Justified?
• May be justified if conduct is morally 
blameworthy
• What if it is merely risky?
• Consensual harm? Caveat investor?
• Many regulatory offences may not 
involve moral blame
Agency Offences
• Harm: suffered not only by the principal
• Economic harm from agency offences 
might be far greater than street crime
• Permissible to criminalize harmful white- 
collar conduct even if it is not morally 
wrongful
• Bodily harm and social harm
• Is imprisonment necessary to prevent 
harm in agency situations?
Model
• Rational actor will trade off the expected 
value of committing the criminal act 
against two variables:
• 1. probability of being caught
• 2. punishment after conviction.
• If probability of being caught is low, 
criminal act might confer value even if the 
punishment is high.
• Same if punishment is low and probability 
is high.
Model
• These 2 variables are a function of 
state resources
• Scholars in the economics tradition 
focused on disutility of punishment
• I focus on disutility of imprisonment
• Probability of conviction is p, the 
length of imprisonment is l, and the 
total disutility is u. 
Disutility of imprisonment
• Total disutility is made up of disutility 
of conviction c and disutility of 
imprisonment i.
• u = p x [(l x i) + c].
• Individuals with a high value for c are 
reputation conscious and those with a 
low value for c are reputation- 
indifferent
Disutility Analysis
• Probability of conviction is 10 percent, the 
disutility of conviction is 200, and the disutility 
of any sentence length is 5, and the sentence 
is 10yrs. Then total disutility is .1 x [(5x10) 
+200] = 25
• Increasing the sanction to 20 years will 
increase the total disutility to .1x [(5x20) 
+200] = 30
• If disutility of any sentence length is 0, then 
total disutility is .1x [(0x10) +200] = 20. 
• Increasing the sentence length to 20 does not 
alter the total disutility at all (.1 x [(0x20) + 
200] = 20.
Reputation Indifferent
• Probability of conviction is 10 percent, 
disutility of conviction is 0, disutility of any 
sentence length is 5 and the sentence is 
10 years. Now total disutility is .1 x [(5x10) 
+ 0] = 5. 
• Increasing the sentence length to 20 years 
results in a total disutility of .1 x [(5x20) + 
0] = 10
Reputation Indifferent
• State can achieve the same disutility for 
this individual as the offender with the 
disutility of conviction of 200 and no 
disutility of imprisonment only by 
imprisoning him for 40 years!
• Conversely, offender with disutility of 200 
on conviction but no disutility on 
imprisonment can be deterred to the same 
extent even by saving money on prison 
costs for 20 years.
Disutility of conviction
• Sending both kinds of offenders to jail for 
the same length is a waste of resources
• Disutility of conviction is hugely significant
• Destroys earning capacity, disqualifies 
from positions of trust…
• Sanctions can be combined to maximize 
disutility of conviction alone
• Information costs are low
US: Some sanctions
• Offender is lawyer:  bar license
• SEC can suspend him from practicing 
before it
• CEO of a company: demit office (Martha 
Stewart)
• Sarbanes-Oxley: section 1105, SEC has 
the power without going to court to issue 
officer and director bars as part of a 
cease-and-desist proceeding
• Standard for a bar is unfitness
Sanctions
• Disgorgements
• Clawbacks: SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 
105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006)
• Section 304 Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
accounting restatement due to material 
noncompliance: CEO & CFO to reimburse 
for--(1) any bonus or other incentive-based 
or equity-based compensation received by 
that person
• (2) profits realised by sale of shares
Sanctions
• SEC v. Sands, 142 F.3d 1186; 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093: 
equitable powers to compel 
disgorgement
• Revoking registration
• Consequential sanctions
• Dismissal from boards
Conclusion
• Imprisonment is a waste of 
resources
• Objectives of punishment can be 
achieved at lower cost
• Variety of non-imprisonment 
sanctions available
• Can be more finely calibrated
